Are busy boards detrimental?

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2013
Volume: 109
Issue: 1
Pages: 63-82

Authors (3)

Field, Laura (not in RePEc) Lowry, Michelle (Drexel University) Mkrtchyan, Anahit (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms. Benefits are lowest among Forbes 500 firms, which likely require more monitoring than advising.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:109:y:2013:i:1:p:63-82
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25