When Do Banks Listen to Their Analysts? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2011
Volume: 24
Issue: 2
Pages: 321-357

Authors (2)

David Haushalter (not in RePEc) Michelle Lowry (Drexel University)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine the conflicts of interest and the flow of information between divisions of financial institutions. Using data on analyst recommendations and stockholdings of investment banks advising acquirers in mergers, we find evidence that information from investment banking flows to other divisions of the bank. Specifically, following a merger announcement, changes in a bank's stockholdings of the acquirer are positively associated with changes in recommendations by its analyst. This relationship, however, does not exist before the merger announcement. Additional tests show that the relationship between stockholdings and recommendations following a merger announcement is strongest when conflicts of interest for analysts are likely the smallest. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:24:y:2011:i:2:p:321-357
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25