Outsourcing, Product Quality, and Contract Enforcement

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2012
Volume: 21
Issue: 1
Pages: 1-30

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Does outsourcing compromise product quality? Does sound contract enforcement alleviate this concern? We offer a simple model to illustrate how outsourcing leads to lower product quality and how contract enforcement helps mitigate this problem. These theoretical predictions are borne out of a survey of 2,400 firms in China conducted by the World Bank in 2003.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:21:y:2012:i:1:p:1-30
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25