Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
We investigate how the transparency of selecting an agent to perform a task affects the agent’s reciprocal behavior. In a modified gift-exchange game, agents either receive information about having (not) been selected or receive no such information at all, which allows to analyze reciprocity of agents who were or were not the preferred choice of the principal. We do not find that transparency is harmful as agents’ reciprocity is not reduced when learning that they have not been selected. Yet, we also do not find that reciprocity increases on average when agents learn they have been selected, although we find a positive effect on the extensive margin. This observation is driven by gender-specific reactions to transparency. While men react with increased reciprocity to the positive signal of having been selected (in line with intention-based reciprocity), women do not. Our observations could be explained by gender-specific attribution styles, i.e., whether the selection is attributed to own characteristics (internally) or good luck (externally).