Optimal sovereign lending and default

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of International Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 111
Issue: C
Pages: 190-213

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A model of dynamic contracting with private information is constructed to study sovereign lending and default. The model endogenizes debt exclusion and provides a theory of reentry and a theory of debt dynamics within the exclusion period. It explains why countries may end up more indebted after the exclusion period. It offers an interpretation for the mixed evidence on the correlation between default probability and indebtedness. It also explains the observed positive correlation between the duration of default and the size of haircut.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:inecon:v:111:y:2018:i:c:p:190-213
Journal Field
International
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25