The European Commission and the revolving door

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2020
Volume: 127
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Luechinger, Simon (Universität Luzern) Moser, Christoph (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Decisions of the EU Commission have important consequences for the corporate sector. Thus, the fact that scores of ex-Commissioners go through the revolving door to work for companies raises concerns. Many suspect companies of profiting from privileged access to information and key decision-makers. We assess whether companies do indeed profit from hiring ex-Commissioners. Based on a unique dataset of all Commissioners who served in the Commissions of Jacques Delors I to José Manuel Barroso II spanning over 29 years, we look at stock market responses to announcements of such hirings. We find positive abnormal returns, which implies that investors anticipate benefits to companies. The reactions are larger for hirings in the first two years after a former Commissioner left office, when connections and insider knowledge are still fresh.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:127:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120300933
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25