Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Econometrics
Year: 2020
Volume: 216
Issue: 2
Pages: 354-374

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the identification of first-price auctions with nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we extend Hu et al. (2013) by relaxing the first-order stochastic dominance condition. Instead, we assume restricted stochastic dominance relations among value quantile functions and show that the same relations pass to bid quantile functions. An ordered tree summarizes these relations and provides a total ordering. Relying on the proposed restricted stochastic dominance ordering, we extend a list of identification results in the empirical auction literature.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:econom:v:216:y:2020:i:2:p:354-374
Journal Field
Econometrics
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25