When to leave carrots for sticks: On the evolution of sanctioning institutions in open communities

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2020
Volume: 191
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Chugunova, Marina (not in RePEc) Luhan, Wolfgang J. (University of Portsmouth) Nicklisch, Andreas (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When asked, people dislike punishment institutions, although punishment is more effective than rewards to maintain cooperation in social dilemmas. Which institution do they choose in the long run? We study migration patterns in a laboratory experiment that allows participants to migrate continuously between punishment and reward communities. The majority of participants initially chooses the reward institution, but a substantial number of subjects joins the less profitable punishment community subsequently. In this case, the mere threat of punishment establishes high contributions. Income differences and missing compensations for cooperators in the reward community are the key factors for the decision to migrate.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:191:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301233
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25