Indeterminacy and learning: An analysis of monetary policy in the Great Inflation

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics
Year: 2016
Volume: 82
Issue: C
Pages: 85-106

Authors (2)

Lubik, Thomas A. (not in RePEc) Matthes, Christian (University of Notre Dame)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Great Inflation of the 1970s can be understood as the result of equilibrium indeterminacy in which loose monetary policy engendered excess volatility in macroeconomic aggregates and prices. The Federal Reserve inadvertently pursued policies that were not anti-inflationary enough because it did not fully understand the economic environment it was operating in. Specifically, it had imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy and was subject to data misperceptions. The combination of learning about the economy and the use of mis-measured data resulted in policies, which the Federal Reserve believed to be optimal, but when implemented led to equilibrium indeterminacy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:moneco:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:85-106
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25