Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2009

Volume: 105

Issue: 2

Pages: 177-180

Authors (2)

Malueg, David A. (University of California-River...) Orzach, Ram (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

When players' affiliated values are symmetrically distributed, expected revenue in the second-price auction equals or exceeds that in the first-price auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). We provide two common-value examples where this ranking fails when players are asymmetrically informed.

Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples

Authors (2)

Abstract

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