Spectrum auction designs and revenue variations

C-Tier
Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2015
Volume: 47
Issue: 17
Pages: 1748-1763

Authors (3)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study examines a sample of 93 national 3G spectrum auctions for the period 2000-2011 to identify the sources of substantial revenue variations. An implied reduced-form econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid (per Mhz, per million populations) values to regulator-determined auction design characteristics, auction competitiveness, mobile wireless market conditions and spectrum package attributes identified from tender documents. The analysis reveals that among other factors, all auction design characteristics independently impact on realized 3G spectrum auction revenues.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:taf:applec:v:47:y:2015:i:17:p:1748-1763
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25