Directors: Older and Wiser, or Too Old to Govern?

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2025
Volume: 60
Issue: 1
Pages: 169-208

Authors (4)

Masulis, Ronald (UNSW Sydney) Wang, Cong (not in RePEc) Xie, Fei (not in RePEc) Zhang, Shuran (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

An unintended consequence of recent governance reforms in the United States is firms’ greater reliance on older director candidates, resulting in noticeable board aging. We investigate this phenomenon’s implications for corporate governance. We document that older independent directors exhibit poorer board meeting attendance, are less likely to serve on or chair key board committees, and receive less shareholder support in annual elections. These directors are associated with weaker board oversight in acquisitions, CEO turnovers, executive compensation, and financial reporting. However, they can also provide particularly valuable advice when they have specialized experience or when firms have greater advisory needs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:60:y:2025:i:1:p:169-208_6
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25