Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 151
Issue: C
Pages: 23-27

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:151:y:2017:i:c:p:23-27
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25