Behavioral learning equilibria in New Keynesian models

B-Tier
Journal: Quantitative Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 14
Issue: 4
Pages: 1401-1445

Authors (4)

Cars Hommes (Bank of Canada) Kostas Mavromatis (de Nederlandsche Bank) Tolga Özden (not in RePEc) Mei Zhu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce Behavioral Learning Equilibria (BLE) into a multivariate linear framework and apply it to New Keynesian DSGE models. In a BLE, boundedly rational agents use simple, but optimal AR(1) forecasting rules whose parameters are consistent with the observed sample mean and autocorrelation of past data. We study the BLE concept in a standard 3‐equation New Keynesian model and develop an estimation methodology for the canonical Smets and Wouters (2007) model. A horse race between Rational Expectations (REE), BLE, and constant gain learning models shows that the BLE model outperforms the REE benchmark and is competitive with constant gain learning models in terms of in‐sample and out‐of‐sample fitness. Sample‐autocorrelation learning of optimal AR(1) beliefs provides the best fit when short‐term survey data on inflation expectations are taken into account in the estimation. As a policy application, we show that optimal Taylor rules under AR(1) expectations inherit history dependence and require a lower degrees of interest rate smoothing than REE.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:quante:v:14:y:2023:i:4:p:1401-1445
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25