On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2023
Volume: 142
Issue: C
Pages: 765-793

Authors (3)

Della Lena, Sebastiano (not in RePEc) Manzoni, Elena (Università degli Studi di Berg...) Panebianco, Fabrizio (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies the evolution of trust and trustworthiness by modeling the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion. The results depend both on features of strategic interaction and on parental transmission. We show that if there is complete information of opponents' traits, independent of parenting style, the share of high-guilt agents in society weakly increases over time, and trust and trustworthiness are maximized. Moreover, when traits are not observable, different levels of guilt always coexist, and trust and trustworthiness might also increase when parents have imperfect empathy in the transmission of traits or if there is homophily in society.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:765-793
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25