Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations: The Effects of the Global Settlement and Related Regulations

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2009
Volume: 22
Issue: 10
Pages: 4189-4217

Authors (4)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the effect of the Global Analyst Research Settlement and related regulations on sell-side research. These regulations attempted to mitigate the interdependence between research and investment banking. We document that following the regulations many brokerage houses have migrated from the traditional five-tier rating system to a three-tier system. Optimistic recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, whereas neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and less informative. Importantly, the overall informativeness of recommendations has declined. The likelihood of issuing optimistic recommendations no longer depends on affiliation with the covered firm, although affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:22:y:2009:i:10:p:4189-4217
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25