A Blotto game with Incomplete Information

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2009
Volume: 105
Issue: 1
Pages: 100-102

Authors (2)

Adamo, Tim (not in RePEc) Matros, Alexander (University of South Carolina)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We consider a Blotto game with Incomplete Information. A pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:100-102
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25