Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2019
Volume: 118
Issue: C
Pages: 511-532

Authors (3)

Azar, Pablo D. (Federal Reserve Bank of New Yo...) Kleinberg, Robert (not in RePEc) Weinberg, S. Matthew (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Prophet inequalities have recently become a fundamental tool in the design of sequential and multi-dimensional mechanisms in Bayesian settings. However, existing mechanisms—as well as the underlying prophet inequalities behind their analysis—require sophisticated information about the distribution from which inputs are drawn.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:511-532
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24