Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2011
Volume: 72
Issue: 1
Pages: 306-313

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Jehiel (1992) and Friedman and Thisse (1993) show that spatial agglomeration appears in a standard two-stage location price model if symmetric firms collude in prices. We introduce a cost difference between two firms. We show that agglomeration never appears in a collusive equilibrium even when the cost difference between firms is sufficiently small.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:306-313
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25