The value of a stochastic information structure

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2008
Volume: 63
Issue: 2
Pages: 679-693

Authors (2)

Azrieli, Yaron (Ohio State University) Lehrer, Ehud (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each signal given a state. For a fixed decision problem, the value of an information structure is the maximal expected utility that the decision maker can get when the observed signals are governed by this structure. Thus, every decision problem induces a preference order over information structures according to their value. We characterize preference orders that can be obtained in this way. We also characterize the functions defined over information structures that measure their value.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:2:p:679-693
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24