The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1989
Volume: 104
Issue: 4
Pages: 823-845

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Insider traders and other speculators with private information are able to appropriate some part of the returns to corporate investments made at the expense of other shareholders. As a result, insider trading tends to discourage corporate investment and reduce the efficiency of corporate behavior. In the context of a theoretical model, measures that provide some indication of the sources and extent of the investment reduction are derived.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:104:y:1989:i:4:p:823-845.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25