Bank profitability, leverage constraints, and risk-taking

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation
Year: 2020
Volume: 44
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model’s predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinin:v:44:y:2020:i:c:s1042957319300233
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25