A Servant to Many Masters: Competing Shareholder Preferences and Limits to Catering

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2013
Volume: 48
Issue: 6
Pages: 1693-1716

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study what determines catering through the payout policy and how catering affects firm value. We create a catering index, measuring how the firm caters to its investors’ payout preferences. The index is based on the revealed payout preferences of mutual funds holding the firm’s stocks. Catering is constrained by market segmentation and dispersion in investor payout preferences. It is also associated with positive value effects: Firms increasing their catering index also experience an increase in value. Furthermore, greater catering ability is associated with a more positive market reaction to corporate announcements of equity issues and dividend payouts.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:06:p:1693-1716_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25