Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 51
Issue: 2
Pages: 346-374

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Firms often choose not to post prices in wholesale markets, and buyers must incur costs to discover prices. Inspired by evidence of customized pricing (e.g., some customers pay up to 70% more than others) and search costs, I estimate a search model to study how personalized pricing impacts efficiency in a wholesale market. I find that price discrimination decreases total surplus by 11.6% and increases the sellers' profits by up to 52.1%. These effects are partially explained by price discrimination softening competition through a decrease in search incentives, illustrating how price discrimination may magnify the efficiency costs of search frictions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:2:p:346-374
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25