Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf Space

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2010
Volume: 19
Issue: 3
Pages: 575-603

Authors (2)

Leslie M. Marx Greg Shaffer (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Slotting allowances are payments made by manufacturers to obtain retail shelf space. They are widespread in the grocery industry and a concern to antitrust authorities. A popular view is that slotting allowances arise because there are more products than retailers can profitably carry given their shelf space. We show that the causality can also go the other way: the scarcity of shelf space may in part be due to the feasibility of slotting allowances. It follows that slotting allowances can be anticompetitive even if they have no effect on retail prices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:575-603
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25