Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 1999
Volume: 14
Issue: 3
Pages: 583-595

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:14:y:1999:i:3:p:583-595
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25