A Holy Alliance: Collusion in the Renaissance Europe Alum Market

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Industrial Organization
Year: 2015
Volume: 47
Issue: 1
Pages: 1-23

Authors (2)

Andrea Günster (not in RePEc) Stephen Martin (Purdue University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

On June 11, 1470, representatives of Pope Paul II and Ferdinand, King of Naples concluded a cartel agreement to restrict competition in the sale of alum. The agreement was one element of a broader plan to monopolize the sale of alum throughout Christendom. We discuss the background of the cartel agreement and analyze its terms (which include arrangements to facilitate detection of and reduce the profitability of defection) and the constraints that limited, but did not eliminate, Rome’s ability to extract economic profit from the European alum market. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:revind:v:47:y:2015:i:1:p:1-23
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25