Revealed Attention

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 102
Issue: 5
Pages: 2183-2205

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The standard revealed preference argument relies on an implicit assumption that a decision maker considers all feasible alternatives. The marketing and psychology literatures, however, provide well-established evidence that consumers do not consider all brands in a given market before making a purchase (Limited Attention). In this paper, we illustrate how one can deduce both the decision maker's preference and the alternatives to which she pays attention and inattention from the observed behavior. We illustrate how seemingly compelling welfare judgments without specifying the underlying choice procedure are misleading. Further, we provide a choice theoretical foundation for maximizing a single preference relation under limited attention. (JEL D11, D81)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:5:p:2183-2205
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25