Statistical discrimination from composition effects in the market for low-skilled workers

B-Tier
Journal: Labour Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 26
Issue: C
Pages: 72-80

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a random search environment with two racial groups each composed of identical numbers of high and low productivity workers, firms use an imperfect screening device (interviews) to control hiring. If inconclusive interviews lead firms to hire majority workers but not minority workers, then the unemployment pool for majority workers is of higher average quality. This can justify the initial hiring choices. Color-blind hiring always eliminates racial disparities but is not necessarily beneficial; in the USA it would improve welfare with only a brief small increase in white unemployment.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:labeco:v:26:y:2014:i:c:p:72-80
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25