On the impossibility of complete Non-Interference in Paretian social judgements

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2013
Volume: 148
Issue: 4
Pages: 1689-1699

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study a principle of ‘Non-Interference’ in social welfare judgements. Non-Interference captures aspects of liberal approaches (particularly a Millian approach) to social decision making. In its full generality, Non-Interference produces an impossibility result: together with Weak Pareto Optimality, it implies that a social welfare ordering must be dictatorial. However, interesting restricted versions of Non-Interference are compatible with standard social welfare orderings.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:4:p:1689-1699
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25