Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1999
Volume: 66
Issue: 3
Pages: 733-741

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterized by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes-Sen principle. This allows a clear interpretation of the NBS as a fair arbitration scheme. In addition, the proposed characterization is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:3:p:733-741.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25