Averting Regulatory Enforcement: Evidence from New Source Review

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2009
Volume: 18
Issue: 1
Pages: 75-104

Authors (3)

Nathaniel O. Keohane (not in RePEc) Erin T. Mansur (Dartmouth College) Andrey Voynov (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper explores firms' response to regulatory enforcement. New Source Review (NSR), a provision of the Clean Air Act, imposes stringent emissions limitations on significantly modified older power plants. In 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sued owners of 46 plants for NSR violations. We study how electricity companies respond to both the perceived threat of future action, and the action itself. A discrete choice model estimates plants likelihood of being named in lawsuits increases with large historic emissions and investments. On the eve of the lawsuits, emissions at plants with a one standard deviation greater probability of being sued fell approximately 10%.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:18:y:2009:i:1:p:75-104
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26