The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics
Year: 2004
Volume: 47
Issue: 1
Pages: 19-43

Authors (3)

Hynes, Richard M (not in RePEc) Malani, Anup (University of Chicago Law Scho...) Posner, Eric A (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Exemption laws enable people who default on loans to protect certain assets from liquidation. Every state has its own set of exemption laws, and they vary widely. The 1978 federal bankruptcy law contains a set of national exemptions, which debtors in bankruptcy are permitted to use instead of their state's exemptions unless the state has formally "opted out" of the federal system. We contend that states' decisions to opt out shed light on their exemption levels. We find that states are more likely to opt out if their state exemption is lower than the federal exemption and that states are more likely to opt out if they also have a high bankruptcy filing rate and transfer little money to the poor. These latter findings suggest that studies that examine the impact of exemptions on, for example, the bankruptcy rate should not treat exemption levels as exogenous variables.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlawec:y:2004:v:47:i:1:p:19-43
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26