Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 122
Issue: 2
Pages: 308-310

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish behavior. In spite of this, the extent of selfish behavior is identical to that in a treatment without counter-punishment opportunities. We discuss explanations for this puzzling finding.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:308-310
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24