A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2012
Volume: 120
Issue: 3
Pages: 513 - 551

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine a dynamic model of up-or-down problem solving. A decision maker can either spend resources investigating a new problem before deciding what to do or decide on the basis of similarity with precedent problems. Over time, a decision-making framework, or jurisprudence, develops. We focus on the model's application to judge-made law. We show that judges summarily apply precedent in some cases. The law may converge to efficient or inefficient rules. With positive probability, identical cases are treated differently. As the court learns over time, inconsistencies become less likely. We discuss the existing empirical evidence and the model's testable implications.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/666655
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26