Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 1992
Volume: 1
Issue: 1
Pages: 9-35

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We augment efficiency‐based theories of ownership by including influence costs. Our principal conclusion is that the prospect of organizational decline and layoffs creates additional influence costs in multiunit organizations that would be absent if there was no prospect of layoffs and would be lessened or eliminated in focused organizations. This helps explain the tendency of firms to divest poorly performing units, as well as the pattern of sales of such units to firms already in businesses related to that of the divested unit.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:1:y:1992:i:1:p:9-35
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26