The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1994
Volume: 109
Issue: 4
Pages: 1157-1184

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze optimal task assignment when a firm needs to learn the abilities of employees. When projects require collaboration between juniors and seniors and only team outputs are observable, having juniors divide their time between two projects ("junior sharing") is less informative about their abilities, but more informative about their senior teammates' abilities, than having juniors devote all their time to a single project ("no sharing"). In an overlapping-generations model, we show that no sharing is more (less) attractive than junior sharing if the prior uncertainty about abilities is small (large) relative to exogenous shocks to team production.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:109:y:1994:i:4:p:1157-1184.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26