Politics and the Fed

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 58
Issue: 1
Pages: 39-48

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the standard policy model, a policymaker optimizes the welfare of a representative agent. In practice, policies are chosen in a political process by agents elected by voters. Drawing on evidence from my two-volume history of the Federal Reserve, the paper reports many examples of decisions influenced by political pressures. The history shows that the meaning of the independence of the Federal Reserve changed over time reflecting political influences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:moneco:v:58:y:2011:i:1:p:39-48
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26