Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2012
Volume: 79
Issue: 1
Pages: 67-87

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

To fully understand the motives for delegating a decision right, it is important to study responsibility attributions for outcomes of delegated decisions. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects could either choose a fair allocation or an unfair allocation or delegate the choice, and we used a punishment option to elicit responsibility attributions. Our results show that, first, responsibility attribution can be effectively shifted and, second, this can constitute a strong motive for the delegation of a decision right. Moreover, we propose a simple measure of responsibility and show that this measure outperforms measures based on inequity aversion or reciprocity in predicting punishment behaviour. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:79:y:2012:i:1:p:67-87
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24