A Union‐bashing Model of Inflation Targeting

B-Tier
Journal: Scandanavian Journal of Economics
Year: 2006
Volume: 108
Issue: 3
Pages: 419-432

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper shows that in an open two‐sector economy, centralization of wage setting may be important in determining the employment (and welfare) effects of different monetary targets. By disciplining unions in the sectors open to international trade, exchange rate targeting yields higher employment than inflation targeting when wage‐setting is more centralized in the open sector than in the shielded sector. When wage‐setting centralization is higher in the shielded sector, we show that general price‐level inflation targeting, while better than exchange rate targeting, is inferior to an inflation target that focuses more heavily on shielded sector prices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:3:p:419-432
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26