Regulating Asset Price Risk

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2011
Volume: 101
Issue: 3
Pages: 410-12

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

There has been a long debate about whether speculators are stabilizing or not. We consider a model where speculators have a stabilizing role in normal times, but may also provoke large risk panics. The very feature that makes arbitrageurs liquidity providers in normal times, namely their tolerance of risk, enables a large increase in asset price risk during a financial panic. We show that a policy that discourages balance sheet risk reduces the magnitude of financial panics, as well as asset price risk in both normal and panic states.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:3:p:410-12
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24