Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 121
Issue: 1
Pages: 12-14

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We derive several implications of incentive compatibility in general (i.e., not necessarily quasilinear) environments. Building on Kos and Messner (2013), we provide a (partial) characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:1:p:12-14
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26