The one player guessing game: a diagnosis on the relationship between equilibrium play, beliefs, and best responses

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 23
Issue: 4
Pages: 1129-1147

Authors (2)

Ciril Bosch-Rosa (not in RePEc) Thomas Meissner (Maastricht University)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is understanding the rules and structure of the game and the other is forming beliefs about the behavior of other players. Typically, these two dimensions cannot be disentangled as belief formation crucially depends on the understanding of the game. We present the one-player guessing game, a variation of the two-player guessing game (Grosskopf and Nagel 2008), which turns an otherwise strategic game into an individual decision-making task. The results show that a majority of subjects fail to understand the structure of the game. Moreover, subjects with a better understanding of the structure of the game form more accurate beliefs of other player’s choices, and also better-respond to these beliefs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09642-2
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26