Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 112
Issue: 2
Pages: 144-147

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We incorporate inferential expectations into the Barro-Gordon model (Barro and Gordon, 1983a) of time inconsistency and consider reputational equilibria. The range of sustainable equilibria shrinks as the private sector becomes more belief-conservative.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:144-147
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-26