Congruent Financial Regulation

B-Tier
Journal: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
Year: 2021
Issue: 1 (Spring)
Pages: 143-196

Authors (2)

Andrew Metrick (Yale University) Daniel Tarullo (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

After the global financial crisis, bank regulation became more stringent, and as a result the traditional banking system was well capitalized leading into the COVID-19 pandemic. But these same regulatory changes also incentivized a continuing migration of traditional banking activities to nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), where looser regulation allowed for dangerous buildups of systemic risk. These risks were then realized across many NBFIs and markets in 2020. While legislation to harmonize regulation across these different domains would be desirable, we do not believe it likely in the foreseeable future. In this paper we propose a congruence principle for financial regulation, whereby regulators use existing statutory authority to coordinate rules across economically similar instruments. We provide examples of how such congruence could work for the cases of nonprime mortgage finance and the markets for US Treasury securities.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bin:bpeajo:v:52:y:2021:i:2021-01:p:143-196
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26