Price versus Quantity: Market-Clearing Mechanisms When Consumers Are Uncertain about Quality.

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Year: 1998
Volume: 17
Issue: 3
Pages: 215-42

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

High-quality producers in a market where quality varies can reap superior profits by charging higher prices, selling greater quantities, or both. Empirical analyses of the mutual fund and automobile industries show that high-quality producers sell more units than their low-quality competitors, but at no higher price (or retail markup) per unit. Our theoretical models find that if qualities are known by consumers and production costs are constant, then having a higher quality secures the producer both higher price and higher quantity. The market may clear in a different fashion if there is "quality uncertainty"; that is, if some consumers can discern quality but others cannot. Then, high- and low-quality producers may end up setting a common price, which allows the high-quality producer to sell substantially more. In this context, quality begets quantity. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:jrisku:v:17:y:1998:i:3:p:215-42
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26