Banking bubbles and financial crises

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 157
Issue: C
Pages: 763-792

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper develops a tractable macroeconomic model with a banking sector in which banks face endogenous borrowing constraints. There is no uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Banking bubbles can emerge through a positive feedback loop mechanism. Changes in household confidence can cause the bubbles to burst, resulting in a financial crisis. Credit policy can mitigate economic downturns. The welfare gain is larger when the government interventions are more front loaded, given that the government injects the same amount of liquidity in terms of present value. Bank capital requirements can prevent the formation of banking bubbles by limiting leverage, but if too restrictive will lead to less lending and hence lower production.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:763-792
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26