Ostracism and Forgiveness

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2016
Volume: 106
Issue: 8
Pages: 2329-48

Authors (2)

S. Nageeb Ali (not in RePEc) David A. Miller (University of Michigan)

Score contribution per author:

4.036 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Many communities rely upon ostracism to enforce cooperation: if an individual shirks in one relationship, her innocent neighbors share information about her guilt in order to shun her, while continuing to cooperate among themselves. However, a strategic victim may herself prefer to shirk, rather than report her victimization truthfully. If guilty players are to be permanently ostracized, then such deviations are so tempting that cooperation in any relationship is bounded by what the partners could obtain through bilateral enforcement. Ostracism can improve upon bilateral enforcement if tempered by forgiveness, through which guilty players are eventually readmitted to cooperative society.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:8:p:2329-48
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26