Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers: A Comment

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2006
Volume: 73
Issue: 2
Pages: 546-547

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note shows that Proposition 5 in Chang and Weisman (Southern Economic Journal 71:821–36) contains a mistake. Although not affecting the paper's basic intuition, our result shows that the parental transfer under the noncooperative game could be less than under the cooperative one if the children oversupply family services.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:73:y:2006:i:2:p:546-547
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26