Risk-taking incentives and risk-talking outcomes

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2024
Volume: 160
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

CEOs’ option-based compensation and discussions about political risk (risk-talking) in successive earnings conference calls are significantly positively associated. This effect is more significant in the subsample of firms with less equity price volatility and poor investment risk-taking (lower capital expenditure). Furthermore, seven out of eight components of risk-talking are positively related to CEOs’ option-based compensation. These findings suggest that CEOs with more options in compensation packages are likely to find discussing political risk during corporate earnings calls as a viable alternative to boost proxies of risk-taking outcomes (such as equity price volatility), especially when they perceive risk-taking expectations to be untenable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:160:y:2024:i:c:s0378426623002753
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26